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Abstract—To improve power efficiency, researchers are experi-
menting with dynamically adjusting the supply voltage of systems
below the nominal operating points. However, production systems
are typically not allowed to function on voltage settings that is
below the reliable limit. Consequently, existing software fault
tolerance studies are based on fault models, which inject faults
on random fault locations using fault injection techniques. In
this work we study whether random fault injection is accurate
to simulate the behavior of undervolted SRAMs.
Our study extends the Gem5 simulator to support fault
injection on the caches of the simulated system. The fault
injection framework uses fault maps, which describe the faulty
bits of SRAMs, as inputs. To compare random fault injection and
hardware guided fault injection, we use two types of fault maps.
The first type of maps are created through undervolting real
SRAMs and observing the location of the erroneous bits, whereas
the second type of maps are created by corrupting random bits
of the SRAMs. During our study we corrupt the L1-Dcache of
the simulated system and we monitor the behavior of the two
types of fault maps on the resiliency of six benchmarks. The
difference among the resiliency of a benchmark when tested with
the different fault maps can be up to 24%.
Index Terms—Fault Injection, Fault Models, Voltage Under-
scaling, SRAMs
I. INTRODUCTION
As predicted by Moore's Law, the scalability of semiconduc-
tor manufacturing process has been the driving force behind
the increase in the capabilities of computer systems. However,
scaling in lower nanometer geometries has led to variability
of transistor characteristics, resulting into increased failure
rates in modern CPUs. Conventional techniques for providing
reliable execution include extra provisioning in logic and
memory circuits in the form of increased voltage margins and
reduced operating frequencies (so-called guardbands), as well
as special error correction circuitry. But all these techniques
consume more power, thus they are not very attractive in light
of the ambitious goal to reach exascale performance with
constrained power budgets. More specifically, guardbanding
may increase power dissipation in the order of 35% [9].
A promising way to increase the energy efficiency of
modern systems, is to remove these guardbands by reducing
the supply voltage of the system while keeping the operating
frequency constant. By doing so, the energy/power consump-
tion of the system is decreased on average by 20% [14], [16].
One of the key aspects of this technique is that the performance
remains the same, since frequency remains the same, all the
energy saving results from the power reduction of the system.
On the one hand, there are many studies which perform
supply voltage underscaling on real systems and monitor the
system. These studies either focus on very specific architec-
tures and technologies, for example SRAMs [1], [12], [19] or
they perform voltage underscaling on the entire system and
monitor the system as a black box [14], [15]. In the first
case, the studies provide very accurate descriptions of the fault
locations and the timings of the faults, however the specific
observations are limited to the specific system and technology.
On the second case, there is almost no information on the
actual fault rate as errors are observed in the output of the
software, thus masked faults are not captured at all.
On the other hand, there are studies which implement
software based fault tolerance techniques which try to yield
the energy benefits of voltage underscaling and will handle
potential errors at the software level [2], [16]. To evaluate these
techniques, they employ fault injection mechanisms which are
guided by fault models and predicts the probability of a fault
for a specific voltage setting. Fault models typically, uniformly
distribute faults to all faulty locations. The uniform distribution
of errors is not accurate. For example, when underscaling the
supply voltage of SRAMs, spatially related errors are common
[18], [19].
In this paper, we compare the accuracy of random based
fault injection with the accuracy of hardware guided fault
injection when undervolting the SRAM of a system. We
implemented a fault injector framework which uses fault
maps as inputs in Gem5 [6]. The faults are injected during
the execution of the simulation. In the end we observe the
manifestation of faults to the applications output. The fault
maps are created using 1) A fault model in which the number
of injected faults is guided by the number of faults appearing
on different real SRAMs, but the faulty location is randomly
selected [11]. 2) Actual fault maps publicly available from
[17]. These fault maps describe the number of errors as well
as their specific bit location of actual undervolted SRAMs.
The main contributions of this work are the following:
• We extend the Gem5 simulator to support fault injection
on the different caches of the system. The fault injection
framework uses as input a fault map, which describes the
location of the faults. These faults are injected during the
execution of the simulation
• We evaluate two fault types of fault maps, the first
fault maps are created with random fault injection fault
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model, whereas the second are fault maps created by
undervolting real SRAMs and capturing the location of
the errors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II
we motivate our study. Section III describes the methodology
we used to perform our analysis and study. In Section IV we
present our evaluation. Section V outlines the related work
and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. MOTIVATION
In this paper, we study whether random fault injection
guided only by a fault rate is sufficient to capture the re-
alistic fault manifestation of undervolted errors. Evaluating
fault models is of great importance as the coverage of any
software error detection technique actually depends on the
fault model. On the one hand, spending resources to detect
errors which will never appear is not efficient. On the other
hand understanding the actual manifestation of undervolted
errors on the software/architecture level can result to more
accurate error detection mechanisms.
Fault models guide the procedure of fault injection, which
is the typical method to evaluate the robustness of a system.
Depending on the approach different fault injections tech-
niques can be utilized. For example, when trying to detect
errors during the execution of the application, researchers
typically use random based fault injection techniques. This
random fault injection is usually guided by a fault model which
determines the number of errors to inject in each experiment
[7], [11], [16] depending on the supply voltage. These models
are agnostic to the actual hardware fault location. Since their
techniques are agnostic to the underlying architecture and thus
they should detect a wide range of errors without focusing on
how these faults are propagated to the software level.
However, a specific SRAM block will behave determinis-
tically when applying voltage underscaling. In other words,
the errors will appear on deterministic fault locations for
the specific SRAM and the specific supply voltage [18].
Although, the same SRAM structure on different chips will
present different fault locations, all of the studied undervolted
SRAMs present a spatial error locality [19]. In other words,
bits that are in close proximity from a faulty bit have higher
probability to be also faulty. Moreover, when undervolting an
SRAM structure there exist a fault inclusion property [19].
Namely, when a bit is faulty for an undervolted supply voltage
setting Vu it will be faulty for any supply voltage Vx < Vu.
This behavior is again not captured by random based fault
injection methods .
In Figure 1 we present two different fault maps, the first
one in Figure 3a is created by using a random fault model, the
second one, in Figure 3b, is a fault map of an actual publicly
available SRAM at [17]. Noticeably, although both fault maps
present the same number of errors, the faulty locations are
different. Namely in the random fault map, each bit has the
same probability to manifest an error, therefore, all errors are
distributed through the entire structure. On the other hand, on
actual hardware, a few errors exist in the higher part of the
(a) Random fault distribution
of an 16Kbits SRAMs.
(b) Fault distribution from
a real undervolted 16Kbits
SRAMs
Fig. 1: Figures represent errors using a random fault model,
and a realistic fault map. Each pixel of the image corresponds
to a specific bit of the SRAM. These fault maps present 600
faulty bits (represented in black color) out of the total 16Kbits.
figure, whereas most of them are clustered in the bottom of
the figure. Interestingly, most of the errors are gathered in a
column wise manner, in other words when an error appears in
a specific column, there are many errors on the same column
on lower lines [19].
III. METHODOLOGY
Our objective is to identify whether the hardware fault
location matters from the perspective of the software when
undervolting the SRAMs of the system. The methodology
consists of 3 steps. The first step is the creation of fault maps.
A fault map is a description of which bit or bits are faulty for a
specific SRAM. Each generated fault map is given as input to
a fault injection framework. The fault injection framework, is
the second step of our methodology. It is based on Gem5 and
simulates a faulty system. During the simulation, it corrupts
the respective bits in the cache as described in the fault map.
The procedure performs a single simulation for each fault
map. The fault injection framework can inject errors to any
cache of the system. Since simulation based fault injection is
a timing consuming procedure, in this work we opt to study
only the effect of faults corrupting the L1-DCache and not
the remaining cache levels. The third step corresponds to the
classification of the output. After each simulation we compare
the output of the application with a golden output, an output
that is created by the application when executed with no errors.
Depending this comparison the experiments are categorized
into different categories. In the following sections we provide
more detailed information for each of this steps.
A. Fault Map Generation
The hardware guided fault injection fault maps are provided
in [17]. There exist different fault maps for a SRAM structure
of 28nm for 7 different undervolted supply voltage settings,
0.54V − 0.60V with a step of 0.01V . For each of these
settings there are 2060 individual fault maps, each one of
them represents a single SRAM structure. Each SRAM is
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Fig. 2: Number of faulty SRAMs (X-axis) that manifest
different number of stuck-at 0 faults (Y-axis)
of size 16Kbits. There exist in total 2060 ∗ 7 = 14420
different fault maps. From these fault maps only the 2174
maps manifest errors during the undervolting. The errors are
stuck-at-0 ones, as previous studies show that the majority
of undervolting SRAMs errors are stuck-at-0 [13], [19]. The
number of errors in each fault map differs depending on the
specific map. In Figure 2 we present from the faulty SRAM
structures how many of them (Y-axis) exist with a specific
number (X-axis) of errors. As depicted in Figure 2 most of the
SRAMs structures present a small number of faults, namely
37%, 15%, 9% and 5% of the faulty SRAMs present 2, 4, 6, 8
of fault bits respectively.
The random fault injection fault maps are generated with the
following methodology. For each of the faulty hardware faults
maps we create an equivalent fault map in terms of number of
faults. For example if the hardware fault map contains 4 faults
we create a random fault map with also 4 faults. However, the
location of the faults are distributed randomly in the bits of
the SRAM. By doing so we can compare only the effect of the
faulty location to the applications resiliency while preserving
the error rate exactly the same among the two methods. From
now on the hardware guided fault injection will be referred ad
HW FI whereas the random one as RND FI.
In Figure 3 we depict the probability of a fault to occur on a
specific bit using the two fault map generation techniques. As
it is obvious in the RND FI all bits have the same probability
whereas in the HW FI bit on the higher addresses are more
probable to manifest errors.
B. Fault Injection Framework
The fault injector framework uses a fault map, which was
provided with one of the methods described above, as an input.
During the initialization of the simulator the fault map is read
and the framework creates a C++ object for each of the faults.
A fault is described by the location, the timing, and corruption
type. The location is described in a hierarchical order, type of
cache (D / I cache), the cache level (L1, L2 etc), which byte
to corrupt in the cache line and which bit in the byte. The
timing behavior of the fault can be expressed as a transient,
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(a) Probability of error for every bit using RND FI.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Bit Index
0
38
76
114
152
190
228
266
304
342
380
418
456
494
532
570
608
646
684
722
760
798
836
874
912
950
988
Ro
w 
In
de
x
0.0000
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 F
au
lt
(b) Probability of error for every bit using HW FI.
Fig. 3: Figures representing the probability of an error to be
faulty.
intermittent or permanent. Transient faults are injected once on
a user defined simulation tick, intermittent ones are described
by the duration of the fault and the initial simulation tick in
which the fault start to appear. The permanent faults constantly
corrupt the faulty bit. Finally the corruption type describes
whether to set the bit on a specific value, this simulates stuck-
at-X faults, or to just perform a a bit flip.
The fault injector framework intercepts all read/write re-
quests for all the caches of the system. For all the requests,
the framework checks whether the cache locations targeted by
the request to the cache include any faulty location in the fault
map. If it does, the framework injects the faults to the faulty
locations. The fault is guided by the fault type, stuck-at-0 faults
set a specific bit to 0 etc. In the case of a transient fault after
injecting the error the fault-object is removed from the internal
data structures. In the case of permanent faults the fault is not
removed. Therefore, in any upcoming request the value will
be injected again, if necessary. This procedure allows us to
observe the manifestation of errors to the applications output.
The fault injector framework can inject faults to any system
simulated with the Gem5 simulator and is orthogonal to the
underlying Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). In this work we
focus on a X86 64 system using system emulation mode. To
project accurately the realistic SRAMs fault maps with the
L1-D cache we use the same size of 16Kbits as the one used
at the undervolting.
C. Benchmark description and categorization
To compare the random based location with hardware
guided location fault models, we used 6 different benchmarks.
1) Jacobi: an iterative numerical solver for determining the
solutions of a diagonally dominant system of linear equations.
2) Blackscholes: a benchmark of the Parsec suite [5]. It
implements a mathematical model for a market of derivatives,
which calculates the buying and selling of assets so as to
reduce the financial risk. 3) DCT: Discrete Cosine Transform
is a module of the JPEG compression and decompression
algorithm [20]. 4) MC: applies a Monte Carlo approach to
estimate the boundary of a sub-domain within a larger partial
differential equation (PDE) domain, by performing random
walks from points of the sub-domain boundary to the boundary
of the initial domain [21]. 5) Sobel: a 2D filter for edge
detection in images. 6) K-Means: an iterative algorithm for
grouping data points from a multi-dimensional space into k
clusters.
After each fault injection experiment the output is classified
as: 1) Correct, The applications’ output after injecting the
faults is bitwise exact with the golden output. 2) Silent
Data Corruption (SDC), the application terminated normally,
however, the output is not bitwise exact in comparison with
the golden one. 3) Crash, the application failed to terminate.
The first categorization performs a classification of the faults
on the resiliency of the application. However, this is not
sufficient to completely characterize the effect of the faults to
the quality of the application. Therefore we perform a further
analysis on the quality of the output for the experiments that
resulted into the SDC category. For the visualization bench-
marks DCT, Sobel we use Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR)
as a quality metric, the largest the value the better the quality of
the output. For the numerical applications Blackscholes, MC,
Jacobi we use the Average Relative Error. Finally, for the
K-Means we use as a quality metric the percentage of data
points that were classified to the correct cluster. The second
analysis of the quality of the output is of great importance.
It actually captures whether the errors had a negative impact
on the quality or not. Stating that an experiment is an SDC
is not sufficient. For example, there are cases in Sobel in
which two experiments were categorized as SDCs, however,
the first experiment resulted to a single wrong pixel, whereas
the second just computed a black image.
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
In Figure 4 we present the high level classification of
the two fault injection methodologies for all the benchmarks
we studied. Interestingly 99% of the observed crashes were
due to accessing unmapped memory regions (Segmentation
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Fig. 4: Classification of the fault injection experiments using
the two different fault injection methods.
faults), therefore we do not provide any further classifica-
tion of crashes. As depicted, three benchmarks demonstrate
significant differences among the two fault injection types.
Namely Jacobi, Sobel and Kmeans present a 23%, 24% and
11% higher crashing rates respectively in the case of RND FI.
In the case of HW FI the higher addresses of the cache are
more often corrupted, whereas in RND FI all addresses have
equal probability to be corrupted. These three benchmarks,
store pointer values to lower addresses, therefore in the case
of HW FI this values are way more infrequently corrupted,
hence the decreased crash rates. The average fault probability
of the two different fault injection methods are presented in
Figure 3, as depicted in HW FI the higher addresses are more
probable to result into errors.
In Figure 5 we present the accumulated results for all the
benchmarks, depending on the number of bit flips that occur
per experiment. We only present experiments that corrupt up
to 16 bits, since, as presented in figure 2 the number of SRAM
structures that present more faults is very small, and therefore
they do not provide any statistical significance. Interestingly,
both fault injection methods can capture accurately the re-
siliency of the application to mask errors, since both correct
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Fig. 5: Classification of the fault injection experiments for all
the benchmarks depending on the number of faulty bits.
HW RND
Fault Injection Method
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
PS
NR
(a) Sobel
HW RND
Fault Injection Method
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
PS
NR
(b) DCT
HW RND
Fault Injection Method
20
40
60
80
100
%
 C
or
re
ct
 C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
ns
(c) KMeans
HW RND
Fault Injection Method
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Re
la
tiv
e 
Er
ro
r
(d) Blackscholes
HW RND
Fault Injection Method
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Re
la
tiv
e 
Er
ro
r
(e) Jacobi
HW RND
Fault Injection Method
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Re
la
tiv
e 
Er
ro
r
(f) Monte Carlo
Fig. 6: Quality of the output for the experiments that resulted to the SDC category.
lines follow the exact same trend. On the other hand this is not
the case for executions in which faults are not masked. Both
fault injection methods present the same trend, the more errors
that occur the higher the probability for the experiment to
result into a crash instead of an SDC. However, in the case of
RND FI the probability of an error to result into an SDC drops
much ”faster” in comparison with the probability of the HW
FI, since the distance between the lines constantly increases
as the number of faults increases. The opposite applies for
the probability of Crash, as the number of errors increase, the
RND FI probability of crash rapidly increases in comparison
to the one of RND FI. This effect is not captured in Figure
4 as the majority of experiments inject two faults, and both
fault injection methods behave similarly when injecting a small
amount of faults.
In HW FI faults present a spatial locality, in other words the
distance between any error is much smaller than the distance
between errors of the RND FI. For example, in Sobel, which
stores mainly pixel values in a specific cache line, any error
corrupting this cache line will result to an SDC. In HW FI as
the number of faults increase the probability to corrupt any
cache line in the system does not increase equally, the same
cache line or neighboring cache lines (which also store pixel
values due to data locality) have a higher probability to have
a corruption. Consequently, it is more likely for errors in HW
FI to corrupt the same application structures and therefore,
not deteriorating the outcome of the application even more.
A. Effect of faults to the Quality of the Output
Figure 6 depicts the quality of the output for each bench-
mark for the experiments that resulted into the SDC category.
The quality of the benchmarks in the first row is presented in
PSNR and % Correct Classifications in which the higher the
value the better the quality is. The second row of the figure the
quality is presented as Relative Error (RE) in which the lower
the value the better the quality is. Since RE can be infinitely
large, we bounded it to be up to 1.0, therefore there are small
’triangles’ created on the top of each of the graphs, this is due
to the concentration of experiments which present RE larger
than 1.0.
Interestingly across all experiments the HW FI technique
results in outputs with higher quality of the output, except of
the Monte Carlo benchmark. To be more precise, in Sobel
( in Figure 6a ) the width of the ”violin” is broader at
higher PSNR values, hence more experiments resulted to
outputs with better quality. This is also depicted by the small
white dot inside the violins, which represents the average
quality of the experiments. K-Means demonstrates very high
accuracy with both fault injection methods, as the widest part
of the ’violin’ is observed at the value 100%. Consequently,
although the algorithm resulted to different cluster centers,
during the classification of the observations where assigned
to the correct cluster. In any case, the HW FI presents once
more a wider ’violin’ at the highest value, therefore more
experiments resulted in better quality values. The same effect
can be observed in DCT, Blackscholes and in Jacobi. In Monte
Carlo is the only benchmark which depicts identical qualities
among the two fault injection methods, this is due to the
randomization of the algorithm, Monte Carlo performs random
walks, even if errors occur that corrupt the randomness of the
application, the application itself considers these erroneous
values as a normal random value. Consequently in the end,
the quality of the output for the 2 different fault injection
approaches is almost identical.
V. RELATED WORK
The reliability implications as well as the energy efficiency
of undervolted systems is heavily studied in literature. Bacha
et al. [3], [4] presents an approach which dynamically reduces
voltage margins while always preserving safe operation. Their
technique is based on the error correction ECC hardware built
on modern processors such as the server-class Intel Itanium.
Several approaches propose methods which ensure correct
operation of caches under undervolted conditions at the mi-
croarchitectural level [8], [10], [22]. Architectural techniques
are presented to eliminate data corruption, and by extension
enable cache operation at scaled voltage settings. The authors
in [18], [19] study the effect of undervotling on several
SRAMs of FPGA and they observe the fault patterns and
fault location. In our work we study the accuracy of random
fault injection models to simulate the behavior of undervolted
SRAMs. The authors in [11] present a failure model of Near-
Threshhold Voltage (NTV) FinFET SRAMs. They propose the
use of a Compound Poisson distribution for projecting yield
estimates for memory arrays operating in the NTV region.
Their model does not take into account the spatial locality
that faults present when operating in the NTV region, In our
work we experimentally monitor the effect of the fault spacial
locality to the application resiliency and quality of output.
The authors in [7] simulate systems with undervolted Branch
Predictor Unit and discuss the trade-offs of energy efficiency
with the accuracy of the predictor. In this work we focus on
undervolting the L1-DCache using real fault maps, and we
discuss whether location agnostic fault injection approaches
are sufficient to characterize the resiliency of applications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present an approach to apply real under-
volting SRAM fault maps to a simulated system and observe
the resiliency of the applications. We compare the hardware
guided fault injection approach with a random guided fault
injection approach. There are significant differences in the
coarse categorization of the resiliency of the application, which
become more obvious as the number of faulty bits increases.
There are also differences when inspecting the quality of the
output among the two techniques. This is because in an real-
istic system not all fault locations have the same probability
to present faults, therefore from the software perspective the
faults can propagate to a limited number of software structures.
This result does not limit the applicability of random based
fault injection. When designing a software fault tolerance tech-
nique the designer needs to take into account all possible fault
locations, as the technique should be effective regardless of the
underlying hardware. However, there is value in optimizing
the fault tolerance techniques for a specific system. Similar to
compilers, which optimize the source code for the specific
hardware, given a set of realistic fault maps that describe
the underlying hardware, one can optimize the fault tolerance
techniques to be more effective against realistic errors, while
being more efficient as the faulty locations are pruned.
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